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THE UNITED STATES NUCLEAR POWER EXPORT PROGRAM: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ITS NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL IMPACTS ON THE
ENVIRONMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1973 an action was brought by the Sierra Club to compel the Atomic
Energy Commission (AEC)1 to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment as required by the National Environmental Policy Act of 19692 on its
nuclear power export program.' The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia ordered the AEC to complete such an impact state-
ment4 even though it did not actually adjudicate the question of whether
NEPA's requirement of an environmental impact statement (EIS) was
applicable to the AEC's activities, primarily because soon after the filing
of the complaint AEC voluntarily decided to prepare an EIS on the overall
nuclear power export process.5 Thus, the court merely ruled on the time
limit for filing the final EIS, designated as 12 months from the date of its
decision, August 3, 1974.
Although the decision in Sierra Club v. AEC6 may appear to be a victory
for environmental advocates and for those concerned with the AEC's re-
sponsibility for the environmental effects of its nuclear power activities in
foreign environments, some unanswered questions persist. One of these is
the adequacy of the final EIS7 which was completed and circulated in April
1976. Another question concerns the scope of such an EIS; i.e., whether it
should include an analysis of impacts on foreign environments as well as
impacts on the environment of the United States. In addition to these
questions, there remains the pervasive dilemma of supplying increased
world demands for energy while at the same time preserving the human
environment against the adverse effects of nuclear power, with special
emphasis on the maintenance of safety and prohibition of the proliferation
of nuclear weapons. This Note will review the adequacy of the EIS in
The AEC has been reorganized into the Energy Research and Development Administra-
tion (ERDA) and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by the Energy Reorganization
Act of 1974, § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 5801 (1974).
2 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970) thereinafter cited
as NEPA]. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 provides that all agencies of the Federal Government shall
include in every recommendation or report a detailed statement of the environmental impact
of the proposed action.
Sierra Club v. United States Atomic Energy Comm'n, 6 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1980, 1981
(1974) (D.D.C., filed Oct. 4, 1973).
Id. at 1983. The court's order was dated Aug. 3, 1974.
Id. at 1981. In a letter to the court dated Mar. 15, 1974, the AEC conceded that NEPA's
EIS requirement was applicable to its actions.
Note 3 supra.
ERDA, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT: U.S. NucLEAR POWER ExPoRT AcTVnES, (No.
1542, April 1976) [hereinafter cited as ERDA No. 1542].
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reference to United States nuclear power export activities and its obliga-
tions to the international community concerning such nuclear exports.
Also examined will be the controversy surrounding the existing systems of
international and domestic safeguards on nuclear energy. Although there
are no immediate answers to the problems associated with nuclear energy,
numerous opinions have been posed concerning its benefits and risks to the
human environment.
The importance of assessing the environmental effects resulting from
nuclear power exports can be more fully appreciated by examining the
nature of the United States export program. A series of interlocking trans-
actions begins with AEC negotiation of a bilateral agreement for coopera-
tion with a foreign government wishing to receive nuclear equipment.8 This
government may then seek financing from the Export-Import Bank for the
proposed purchase of nuclear equipment and fuel. Once the financing is
approved, the foreign purchaser must obtain an export license from the
AEC before completion of the transaction is effected. If a fuel supply
contract is also executed, the fuel which is not consumed during the opera-
tion of foreign reactors is returned to the United States for reprocessing and
storage.' Thus, the AEC could be assuming responsibility for the mainte-
nance of radioactive wastes from both domestic and foreign nuclear reac-
tors. Almost 50 percent of the nuclear enrichment facility production of the
United States is destined for foreign use and heavy demand is being placed
on domestic energy supplies. 0 Such facts emphasize the propriety of forc-
ing AEC to file an EIS on its nuclear power export program.
II. ADEQUACY OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
A. Domestic and International Scope of NEPA
According to the express language of NEPA, the scope of the Act is
intended to be global. All federal agencies are directed to "recognize the
worldwide and long-range character of environmental problems."" Thus,
the purpose of NEPA, and its EIS requirement, is "to assure that the
United States itself is never responsible for unanticipated environmental
injury anywhere."'"
The AEC's decision in Sierra Club v. AEC to file an EIS constitutes a
change from the previous assumption that NEPA's EIS requirement did
not apply to the State Department and other foreign affairs agencies. The
Environmentalists Challenge Nuclear Export Program, 3 ENVT'L L. REP. 10181 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Environmentalists].
,Id.
Id.
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E) (1970).
' Robinson, Extraterritorial Environmental Protection Obligations of Foreign Affairs
Agencies: The Unfulfilled Mandate of NEPA, 7 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL. 257, 270 (1974).
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principal justification for this previous position was that any attempt to
apply NEPA's systematic, interdisciplinary approach to foreign territory
would be very difficult to sustain against charges of encroachment."3 Now,
however, the State Department and the AEC recognize their duty to file
an EIS. 4
Although the Energy Research and Development Administration
(ERDA) did file an EIS in compliance with NEPA, it nevertheless limited
the scope of its assessments to the environmental impacts in the United
States and on the high seas resulting from United States nuclear export
activities. Several commentators on the EIS have criticized this limitation
of its scope. 5 In justification of its position, ERDA states that expansion
of the statement's scope to include environmental impacts from foreign
nuclear power programs over which the United States has no decision
making role is inappropriate.' 6 While asserting that these problems are
international in scope and require international solutions, ERDA states
that a country-by-country evaluation would be too speculative. 7 The EIS
further states that expanding the scope to include impacts on foreign envi-
ronments would create risks of international repercussions arising from
claims of encroachment by the United States. In effect, the United States
would be making a substantive decision as to whether the decision by a
foreign nation to pursue the nuclear power option was in the best interests
of that nation and its citizens."6
Although ERDA's arguments sound convincing, there remains room for
debate regarding the applicability of NEPA to federal actions outside the
United States.'9 Since the nuclear power export program is relatively large
and environmentally significant, application of NEPA to the program
seems appropriate. There is little reason to believe that foreign govern-
ments would resent being informed of the environmental consequences of
their purchases. This is especially important in nuclear sales to less devel-
oped nations which may lack the expertise necessary to conduct such anal-
yses on their own.10 A disclosure of foreign impacts would assist other
nations in deciding whether and to what degree they should utilize nuclear
power.2
One of the comment letters to ERDA concerning the EIS postulated that
even though certain activities occur on foreign soils, the consequences of
'3 Id. at 261.
" Id. at 266.
See generally ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, app. E, comment letters: E-11, E-12, E-17.
ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, at ii.
'7 Id. at iii.
I /d.
" Environmentalists, supra note 8.
Id. at 10181-82.
" Letter from Eldon V.C. Greenberg to W.H. Pennington (Oct. 22, 1975), reprinted in
ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, at app. E, E-17 at 6 [hereinafter cited as Greenberg].
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those activities could directly affect the environment of the western hemi-
sphere or of the entire world. 2 Since the United States is part of this
environment it would seem prudent for ERDA to assess environmental
impacts on foreign surfaces. However, even if impacts on foreign countries
are not assessed, ERDA should at least estimate the possible impacts on
the United States resulting from the injection of radioactive material into
the global or hemispheric atmosphere or by oceanic circulation.2 3
Since ERDA obtains information regarding the recipient country's plans
for nuclear development when it negotiates contracts to supply enriching
services, 24 it would be possible for ERDA to assess the impacts such facili-
ties will have on that country's environment. An additional input of infor-
mation to ERDA would result from the recipient's reports to ERDA of any
shutdowns or accidents which may occur after the reactor is operating.
25
In summary, the basic difference between ERDA's position and that of
its critics on the scope of the EIS appears to be one of perception. ERDA
assumes that any United States assessment of foreign environmental im-
pacts will be an impermissible direction to foreign countries of what they
should do concerning their nuclear power policies. On the other hand, the
critics suggest that such an assessment would serve as an analytical aid to
these countries who would be free to accept or reject such aid.
Substantial support for claims that NEPA requires environmental anal-
ysis of an agency's impacts on foreign environments can be found in a
recent case involving the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID).26 The Environmental Defense Fund instituted an action to
compel AID to analyze the impacts on foreign environments resulting from
the use of pesticides exported by AID. Included in AID's Commodity Eligi-
bility List of pesticides to be exported were DDT, aldrin and dieldrin.
Since the Environmental Protection Agency had banned domestic use of
DDT in 1972 and suspended the use of aldrin and dieldrin in October 1974,
it seemed obvious that these pesticides posed significant environmental
risks. 27 Consequently, the effects on foreign environments should have been
included in AID's programmatic EIS.
In a response similar to the AEC's position limiting its EIS to the domes-
tic impacts of its export program, AID sought to defend its own EIS by
claiming that NEPA does not apply to the foreign impact of activities
2 Letter from Gene I. Rochlin to W.H. Pennington (Oct. 16, 1975), reprinted in ERDA No.
1542, supra note 7, at app. E, E-12 at 1 [hereinafter cited as Rochlin].
23 Id.
11 Greenberg, supra note 21, at 6.
25 Id.
2' Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. United States Agency for Int'l Dev., 6 ENVT'L L.
REP. 20121 (1976) (D.D.C., Dec. 5, 1975).
27 International Application of NEPA: Environmentalists Challenge Pesticide Aid
Program, 5 ENVT'L L. REP. 10086 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Pesticide Program].
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outside the United States. 8 This defense, however, was rejected by the
court. Instead, the parties agreed that AID would, within 10 months, file
a programmatic EIS on its international pesticide activities. 9 In its assess-
ment AID was to analyze the environmental impact, including unavoida-
ble adverse impacts, of current and reasonably anticipated pesticide activ-
ities "wherever such impacts or activities occur."3 AID must also analyze
reasonable alternatives and their environmental effects.3 By analogy the
argument could be made that if one foreign affairs agency is required to
assess the foreign environmental impacts of its activities, then all such
agencies should be similarly forced to comply with this interpretation of
NEPA. Thus, ERDA could possibly face the task of revising its EIS to
include foreign impacts in its analysis. However, it should be noted that
significant differences in both policy and value judgments exist between
the export of pesticides and the export of nuclear technology. Although
pesticides such as DDT are useful in controlling unwanted pests, the
known risks of such substances causing cancer may far outweigh any bene-
fits derived from their use. In contrast, the risks involved in using nuclear
power may not outweigh the benefits of increased supplies of energy. This
is especially relevant in view of the current fuel crisis in the United States
and in many parts of the world.
B. Unavoidable Adverse Environmental Effects
While the subject EIS provides a detailed discussion of the environmen-
tal impacts on the United States and the high seas, an understandable and
representative summary of these impacts is presented in its cost-benefit
analysis. Included in the environmental considerations is the land commit-
ted for the mining and milling of uranium. Based on a 25 year cumulative
index, a total of 20,000 acres is estimated to be committed by the year 2000.
The comparable amount of land necessary to produce the equivalent
amount of energy from coal is about 30 to 35 times more land, if used for
strip mining. 2 Although the ecology of these 20,000 acres will be totally
destroyed, ERDA states that future state and federal regulations requiring
mine-land reclamation will mitigate some of this impact.3
Further commitments of land will be necessary for the operation of en-
richment services. A total of 3,700 acres of land will be required for process
buildings, power generating stations and other related on-site activities.
About 37,000 additional acres will be needed to provide buffer zones
, Id. at 10084.
6 ENVT'L L. REP. at 20121.
30 Id. (emphasis added).
31 Id.
31 ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, § 13 at 7.
3 Id. at 10.
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around these facilities in order to minimize public exposure and access and
to maximize security control. All of these aforementioned facilities will
require 158 billion gallons of water per year in order to dissipate the heat
associated with the enrichment process. 4
Assuming the prospective shortage of enrichment capacity, one com-
mentator has suggested that ERDA should consider the pressure that
might be exerted on domestic needs if the obligations to fulfill foreign
orders are given high priority. Also, the capital required to expand enrich-
ment capacity to fulfill foreign orders could have an indirect impact on the
United States by diverting needed capital from other uses.
35
Another adverse effect would be the release of chemicals, both radioac-
tive and nonradioactive. These releases are estimated to have little or no
effect on the local environment surrounding fuel cycle facilities. This mini-
mal effect is partly attributable to the process whereby state and federal
regulatory agencies review both the preconstruction and operation phases
of the facilities.3 1 Supposedly, these agencies would restrict chemical re-
leases to tolerable levels.
Inherent in the nuclear energy process is the production of radioactive
wastes. Public concern over nuclear safety is focused mainly on the storage
of these radioactive wastes.3 7 This seems especially evident when one con-
siders that these materials will remain radioactive or toxic, or both, for
thousands of years. Presently in the United States, wastes are stored in
solidified or liquified form at ground level in heavily shielded containers
which will hold the wastes for hundreds of years. 3
ERDA's EIS seems somewhat deficient in its discussion of the environ-
mental effects of radioactive waste and waste management. Rather than
discussing the problems involved with storage and possible accidents, the
EIS focuses on the environmental effects of management events prior and
up to the storage of wastes. Thus, it discusses three possible effects of waste
burial facility construction. 39 Although accidental openings of waste pack-
ages might occur at a commercial land burial facility, the environmental
impact is estimated to be insignificant. 0
Evidence that neither the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) nor
ERDA can lightly ignore the effects of waste disposal is shown in a recent
34 Id.
Rochlin, supra note 22, at 4-5.
ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, § 13 at 11.
57 Doub & Dukert, Making Nuclear Energy Safe and Secure, 53 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 756, 767,
768 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Doub & Dukert].
I Id. at 767. Germany uses underground storage, while Japan is considering all forms of
long-term waste disposal.
11 ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, § 5 at 96. These include the temporary dust and noise
during construction of offices and laboratories, periodic evacuation and filling of trenches,
and the presence of an exclusion fence around the area.
11 Id. at 97.
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action brought by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC)." The
court there held that the licensing of individual reactors must consider the
effects of waste disposal as irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources.2 Two appeals were consolidated and brought before the court
challenging the decision of NRC not to prescribe mandatory consideration
of the effects of radioactive waste disposal." The court rejected arguments
that these issues were too speculative, or that they should only be con-
sidred when waste disposal facilities are themselves licensed. Adhering to
the decision in Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. (SIPI) v.
AEC," the court recited again that the obligation to make reasonable
forecasts of the future is implicit in NEPA, and held that the agency
cannot shirk its responsibilities by labelling any and all discussions of
future environmental effects as "crystal bail inquiry.'
' 5
Since plutonium is one of the most toxic substances known to exist and
requires isolation from the environment for at least 250,000 years before it
becomes harmless, the wastes generated by nuclear reactors are not "de
minimis."'' Consequently, waste disposal may become an ever increasing
problem. Since seabed disposal of high-level wastes from foreign activities
may prove too costly, hazardous or difficult, foreign recipients of nuclear
power from the United States may rely upon the United States to store
their wastes. Foreign policy considerations and the need for global environ-
mental protection may eventually outweigh domestic reluctance to accept
such foreign wastes. 7 Since the United States may be forced to handle
worldwide problems of waste disposal it seems imperative that the EIS
consider the entire range of ramifications of this problem.
C. Alternatives to Nuclear Exportation
Also included in NEPA's requirement for an adequate EIS is a discus-
sion of "alternatives to the proposed action."18 In evaluating the adequacy
of ERDA's discussion of alternatives in its EIS, it is helpful to consider the
decision in NRDC v. Morton.9 Considering the Department of the Inte-
" Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 6 ENVT'L L.
REP. 20615 (1976) (D.D.C., July 21, 1976).
12 Id.
'1 Id. at 20615-16. One of the appeals, No. 74-1385, involved a proceeding to license the
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station near Vernon, Vt., in which the Appeals Board held
that Licensing Boards did not have to consider the operations of reprocessing plants or the
disposal of wastes in individual licensing proceedings. In the second appeal, No. 74-1586, the
Commission had stated in a rulemaking proceeding that the effects of waste disposal were
relatively insignificant, but that it was preferable to take them into account.
481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
, Id. at 1092.
, 6 ENVT'L L. REP. at 20616.
, Rochlin, supra note 22, at 9.
" NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(iii) (1970).
458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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rior's EIS on its proposal for an oil and gas general lease sale, the court
stated that NEPA requires the presentation of environmental risks inci-
dent to alternative courses of action which are reasonably available. 0 More
explicitly, the EIS should discuss such impacts even though it entails the
weighing of numerous matters such as economics, foreign relations and
national security.5' Thus, the agency should not be excused from discussing
an alternative merely because it does not offer a complete solution to the
problem .52
Three main alternatives to the nuclear power export program were pro-
posed by ERDA. These consisted of terminating nuclear power exports,
imposing additional controls on nuclear exports, or continuing nuclear
exports improved by technology designed to minimize adverse environ-
mental impacts in the United States. 53 There are certain possible advan-
tages to a termination or reduction of exports. Potential customers may
perceive such action as a signal that the United States considers the risks
too great to continue the program, thus suggesting a reevaluation of their
own nuclear power programs. Termination of exports additionally would
help reduce the proliferation of nuclear explosives, since customers would
either terminate or delay their nuclear power plans if nuclear materials
could not be obtained elsewhere.54
On the other hand, the EIS discusses potential disadvantages of a reduc-
tion or termination of the nuclear power export program. Since the United
States has promoted the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy
under international safeguards and controls, such a reduction or termina-
tion would have an adverse effect on the use of adequate safeguards. 5 The
United States requires that its recipients accept such safeguards and con-
trols while other suppliers do not. Therefore, the EIS assumes that recipi-
ent countries would not adhere to international safeguards if they were
purchasing nuclear technology from countries other than the United
States. A termination or reduction of United States exports would force
these recipients to purchase from other countries, resulting in a decreased
observance of international safeguards.
Termination could also cause a significant reduction in foreign policy
influence and national security. 6 According to former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, "United States constraints by themselves will have little
effect if other nuclear suppliers decline to exercise the same restraints."'57
" Id. at 834.
I1 Id.
52 Id. at 836.
5 ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, § 9 at 1.
Id. at 10.
'Id.
" Id. § 13 at 12.
'7 Hearing on S. 1439 before the Comm. on Government Operations, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
768 (1976) (statement by Secretary Kissinger).
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Thus, the policy of ERDA appears to justify nuclear power exports by the
United States on the assumption that if recipient countries do not buy
from the United States, they will buy from another supplier.
This underlying policy is also present in the discussion of the second
alternative of imposing additional safeguards and controls on United
States exports. This alternative is expected to induce purchasing nations
to seek alternative sources for related materials and equipment, including
the development of their own domestic capabilities. This would conse-
quently reduce United States influence over foreign nuclear materials
usage. Although a benefit would be the reduction of domestic environmen-
tal impact, there would be an adverse impact on foreign policy influence
and national security. 51
The third alternative, upgrading technology to minimize adverse envi-
ronmental impacts, would have little effect on the level of exports, eco-
nomic benefits, or United States foreign policy and national security objec-
tives. In fact, this third option could be implemented irrespective of export
activities. 59 This is essentially due to the fact that the upgrading of technol-
ogy is primarily a domestic endeavor. Ideally, this could be accomplished
within the United States, without involving any foreign policy determina-
tions. This would also inadvertently minimize impacts abroad, since for-
eign exports are drawn from the present domestic supply of nuclear power.
One suggestion which has aroused considerable debate is a temporary
moratorium on new nuclear export commitments. The EIS states that this
is already occurring to some extent since ERDA has reached the limit of
its uranium enrichment capacity and has ceased entering into new fuel
supply commitments, pending a decision on the construction of new en-
richment plants in the United States. In addition to causing a loss of future
export revenue, a temporary moratorium would diminish American influ-
ence on the development of international safeguards and physical security
policies."
A criticism of ERDA's stance in relation to such a moratorium is that
"[iut is by no means morally, ethically, or politically defensible to justify
a dangerous U.S. policy on the grounds that if we do not do it, someone
else will."'" Rather than improving United States influence abroad, the
sale and distribution of a technology that "may prove to be neither useful
nor cost-effective in the country that receives it will neither improve nor
maintain credibility of U.S. promotional efforts abroad."62
According to Adlai E. Stevenson III, a one-year moratorium would re-
Is ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, § 13 at 12.
I9 d.
0 Id. § 9 at 15.
" Rochlin, supra note 22, at 10.
" Id. at 11.
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duce competitive pressures to export.6 3 He suggests that the United States
should sell nuclear reactors only to countries which conform all of their
facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The
scope of such a moratorium would include supplies of fuel, technology and
nuclear-related materials, excepting those commitments under existing
contracts. The end result may be to initiate efforts to obtain more effective
safeguards and security systems.6
Although ERDA seems to recommend using nuclear development along
with other programs such as solar energy and geothermal energy, it does
not formally present such forms of energy as alternatives to the nuclear
power export program. This decision by ERDA, as evidenced in its draft
EIS, drew much criticism from experts in the fields of both geothermal and
solar energy. The Managing Director of the Geothermal Energy Institute
stated that ERDA's view that geothermal and wind technologies are not
sufficiently developed so as to make significant contributions to foreign
energy needs is scientifically unsupportable."e He continues his support of
geothermal technology by pointing out that other countries would need
United States aid only in bringing reservoirs on stream and in installing
power plants, since these countries would already have the necessary fuel
for such technology, geothermal stream." Thus, it would not be necessary
to export extensive technologies or dangerous nuclear fuel, as in the case
of nuclear energy exports.
Solar energy should also be seriously considered as a source of virtually
unlimited quantities of clean power." However, ERDA failed to fully dis-
cuss this alternative and even expressly stated that "a systematic assess-
ment has not yet been completed of direct and indirect environmental
issues of the solar product life cycle." 8 This apparently violates the man-
date proclaimed in NRDC v. Morton, which stated that a federal agency
must discuss the environmental impacts of reasonably available alterna-
tives to the proposed course of action.6 One reason for this failure to
discuss reasonable alternatives may be that ERDA is deeply entrenched
in the practice of the nuclear power export program, which has continued
for over 20 years. There are also strong financial investments in the nuclear
11 Stevenson, Nuclear Reactors: America Must Act, 53 FORMGN AFFAmRS 64, 71 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Stevenson].
64 Id.
0 Letter from Donald F.X. Finn to W.H. Pennington (Aug. 18, 1975), ERDA No. 1542,
supra note 7, app. E, E-1 at 1.
I d. Although the United States possesses very competent geothermal engineering tech-
nology, it is not alone in its endeavors. At the May 1975 United Nations International Confer-
ence on Geothermal Resources, Japan, Italy, the Soviet Union, Mexico, New Zealand and
Turkey all presented papers on their respective research in the geothermal energy area.
'7 Greenberg, supra note 21, at 63.
' ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, app. D-2.
'5 458 F.2d at 834.
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energy field which are not present in such fields as geothermal or solar
energy. It is interesting to note that comment letters submitted to ERDA
from various investors in nuclear energy seemed to endorse the EIS as
being fully adequate.
70
D. Hazards of Nuclear Reactor Operations
The alternatives to the nuclear power export program must be analyzed
in view of the hazards associated with the actual operation of nuclear
reactors. Although the AEC has concluded that the consequences of poten-
tial reactor accidents are much smaller in many cases than those of non-
nuclear accidents, 7' there exists the possibility that a maximum melt down
accident could kill as many as 2,300 people. 72 The only way for large
amounts of radioactivity to be released by the fission process is by melting
the fuel in the reactor core. Although a series of sequential failures must
occur before the fuel will overheat, the problem is grave. Even radioactive
decay of fuel continues to generate heat, requiring the installation of re-
dundant decay heat removal systems."3
While assessing the probability of a core melt accident as one every
17,000 years per plant, one reactor study states that all immediate and
latent effects from such an accident are estimated to be very small.7' De-
layed or latent effects of exposure could cause an increase in the incidence
of cancer, genetic effects and thyroid gland illnesses over a 10-20 year
period. 7 Economically, the costs of such an accident would be about
$100,000 in property damage.76 Another consequence of a major accident
could be the forced evacuation of persons near the plant site, with such
relocation lasting until the radioactivity either dissipated or was removed.
An additional major concern would be the monitoring of farm produce to
reduce the amount of radioactivity ingested through the food chain.77 This
is especially important since the effects of radioactive doses are cumulative
both in the individual and the offspring.78
7o See Letter from Hunton, Williams, Gay & Gibson to W.H. Pennington (Oct. 21, 1975),
ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, app. E, E-16. See also Letter from Jarvis D. Cotton to W.H.
Pennington (Oct. 22, 1975), ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, app. E, E-26.
71 Rasmussen, Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment of Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial
Nuclear Power Plants, 16 ATOMIc ENERGY L.J. 177, 178 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Reactor
Study].
11 Letter from L. Douglas DeNike to W. H. Pennington (Sept. 4, 1975), ERDA No. 1542,
supra note 8, app. E, E-2 at 4. [hereinafter cited as DeNike]. Such an accident could also
make 5600 persons acutely ill and cause 3200 latent cancers.
" Reactor Study, supra note 71, at 187.
7, Id. at 193.
7 Id. at 192-93.
u Id. at 199.
" Id. at 198.
' Dickstein, National Environmental Hazards and International Law, 23 INT'L & COMP.
L. Q. 426, 428 (1974).
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The extent of consequences arising out of a nuclear accdent is dependent
on conditions under which the accident occurs. The AEC study identifies
three factors which may determine the seriousness of such an accident.
One of these is the amount of radiation released into the atmosphere. Also
important is the method by which radiation is dispersed by prevailing
weather conditions and the number of people exposed to the radiation."
All these factors are significant in assessing the hazards of reactor opera-
tion.
E. Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources
Another EIS requirement is that the agency must evaluate any irreversi-
ble and irretrievable commitments of resources.0 This has been accom-
plished by ERDA, although in perhaps a terse and abbreviated fashion.
The most significant commitment of resources appears to be the use of
electrical power. Out of an estimated 1400 billion kilowatt hours (kWh)
required by gaseous diffusion plants, 575 billion kWh will be consumed by
export activities. In addition to the utilization of 350 million tons of coal,
112 x 109 standard cubic feet of natural gas will be used by the year 2000.
Also, the United States will mine 197,000 metric tons of natural uranium
by the year 2000 for export activities.8
Land irreversibly committed to nuclear export activities is limited by
the EIS to land used for the storage of low level wastes resulting from
uranium hexafluoride conversion, enrichment and fuel fabrication serv-
ices. By the year 2000, this commitment will require 1,000 acres of land.
Mention is also made of the commitment of human resources in the form
of 10,000 to 23,000 highly skilled and trained persons working in fuel cycle
activities related to projected exports."
F. Relationship Between Short-Term and Long-Term Productivity
These irreversible commitments of resources are directly related to the
relationship between the short-term uses of man's environment and long-
term productivity. An analysis of this relationship is also required by
NEPA." The principal long-term effect of nuclear power export activities
is the management of low level radioactive wastes. The projected 1,000
acres needed for waste disposal is 2.7 percent of the land committed to
total waste disposal, including domestic disposal, over the balance of the
century. Since uranium ores constitute a finite resource, the export of
"' Reactor Study, supra note 71, at 194-95. All estimates were based on the assumption that
evacuation procedures would be used to move most persons out of the path of airborne
radiation.
- NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(5) (1970).
" ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, § 12 at 1.
82 Id.
- NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c)(4) (1970).
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197,000 metric tons will hasten the depletion of domestic supplies of ura-
nium and may also preclude the utilization of this ore by future genera-
tions. United States coal reserves are also a finite resource which will be
reduced by the projected export related consumption of 350 million tons
by the year 2000.4
Justification for such exploitation of industrial capacity and its natural
resources for nuclear power export activities is based by ERDA on three
factors. Primarily, the United States will increase its world influence in
terms of its conduct of foreign policy and national security. Secondly,
favorable revenues and balance of payments benefits are results of such
activities. Finally, the additional employment of local workers will result
from nuclear export activities."s
Important to discuss at this point is ERDA's analysis of the costs and
benefits of continuing the nuclear power export program. One prime bene-
fit is that nuclear export revenues are predicted to account for 3.6 percent
of the total United States export revenues by the year 2000. Other benefits
include increased employment opportunities in the domestic nuclear in-
dustry and in the supporting materials supply organizations, as well as
increased tax revenues from industrial, commercial and residential sectors
of the economy."6 In comparison, ERDA asserts that the sole cost in achiev-
ing national security and foreign policy goals is the risk of increasing oppor-
tunities for diversion, theft or sabotage of potential weapons material. The
EIS concludes that
continuation of United States nuclear export activities will be essential
. . . to enable the United States to assert a position of leadership in
international nuclear affairs sufficient to assure the maintenance and
improvement of international safeguards and other national security con-
trols on nuclear energy developments abroad, and to improve interna-
tional environmental and safety standards. 7
Since this conclusion seems to be based on the bottom line assumption
that international safeguards and safety standards are presently inade-
quate, a review of present safeguards systems seems appropriate.
III. RISKS AND CONTROLS IN THE NUCLEAR POWER EXPORT PROGRAM
A. International Safeguards Systems
Since nuclear energy is an international concern, a balance between
expansion and risk can only be achieved through a multinational frame-
work for controlling nuclear facilities and materials. The already existing
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provides the basis for such a
94 ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, § 10 at 1.
SId.
86 Id. § 13 at 7.
'7 Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
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framework."' Established in 1956 as an affiliated agency of the United
Nations, the IAEA sought to "accelerate and enlarge the contribution of
atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world."', The
agency was also charged with the establishment and administration of
safeguards designed to ensure that no nuclear materials or facilities were
used for military purposes. 0
Primarily, the IAEA has never had authority to limit or influence mili-
tary programs of countries which already possess nuclear weapons.' Fur-
thermore, IAEA safeguards have mainly focused on facility inspection and
an accounting system. Consequently, such safeguards are helpful only to
detect diversion of significant quantities of nuclear materials from peaceful
activities."
Duties relegated to the IAEA were greatly expanded in 1970 by the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (hereinafter referred
to as NPT),'3 which gave IAEA the responsibility for monitoring compli-
ance with its provisions. Under the NPT, nonnuclear weapons states
agreed to accept IAEA safeguards in order to prevent diversion of nuclear
energy to nuclear weapons,9" while nuclear weapons states agreed not to
transfer nuclear weapons to recipient states. 5 However, the treaty also
provided for the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and
scientific information for peaceful uses of nuclear energy."
Vitally important is the fact that 36 members of the United Nations
have not signed the NPT, including France and China, while 15 signatories
have not ratified the treaty. 7 The provisions prohibiting transfers of weap-
ons, while encouraging exchanges of nuclear material and technology, dis-
play a potential contradiction in the treaty as weapons can easily be made
from certain nuclear materials and technology. The treaty also requires
safeguards on the recipient country's nuclear facilities, but allows assis-
tance to nations refusing to join the treaty. Although imposing limitations
on transfers by nuclear weapons states, the treaty imposes no such limita-
tions on subsequent transfers by recipients to other countries. Overriding
all these potential contradictions is the fact that the treaty contains no
sanctions."
" Doub & Dukert, supra note 37, at 757.
Statute of International Atomic Energy Agency, art. 2, opened for signature Oct. 26,
1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 1095, T.I.A.S. No. 3873 (effective for United States July 29, 1957).
* Id. art. 3, para. 5.
" Doub & Dukert, supra note 37, at 758.
" ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, § 6 at 24.
' Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
T.I.A.S. No. 6839 (effective for United States Mar. 5, 1970) [hereinafter cited as NPT].
Id. art. 3, para. 1.
" Id. art. 1.
Id. art. 4, para. 2.
'7 Doub & Dukert, supra note 37, at 759.
" Stevenson, supra note 63, at 67, 68.
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At the time the treaty was signed, no agreement existed as to what the
safeguards would be, since this was left up to individual state agreements
with the IAEA. The United States has voluntarily applied IAEA safe-
guards to its facilities, although it was not obligated to do so under the
NPT." Such concern about the potential ineffectiveness of IAEA safe-
guards would not be warranted unless there were significant risks involved
in the nuclear power process. According to ERDA's EIS, serious risks in-
herent in its export program are divided into three categories.
The first category includes the risk that nuclear materials are subject to
theft either within the United States or in foreign countries by subnational
groups which may wish to make explosive devices. Since there has been a
recent increase in terrorist incidents throughout the world, this threat
seems to be a realistic one. Such terrorists could use nuclear material to
make explosives, to disperse radioactivity or merely to sell to other custom-
ers to finance further operations. The EIS treatment of this subject fails
to predict the probability of such an event occurring and merely assumes
that a serious threat is possible.'0 Presently, primary measures to protect
nuclear materials against diversion by criminals or political terrorists are
being taken on a national basis, since the IAEA has not taken a direct role
in this area. However, it may be possible to develop an IAEA safeguards
system with the help of individual nations and their programs. 0'
One commentator to the EIS has estimated that the malicious dispersal
of very small amounts of plutonium could necessitate evacuation and de-
contamination of several square kilometers for long periods of time, thus
costing millions of dollars. 0 2 While the EIS does not fully evaluate conse-
quential deaths or injuries resulting from radioactive dispersal, it does
predict that the critical human area affected would be the lungs, due to
inhalation. Dispersal could be accomplished in corridors or ventilation
systems, from moving vehicles or aircraft, by explosion or by fire. 03
A second major category of risks identified by the EIS is potential sabo-
tage of radioactive material shipments in transit within the United States
or on the high seas.1'0 In 1974, there were approximately one million ship-
ments in the United States of radioactive materials by all types of carriers,
with 10-25 percent of these being special nuclear materials. 5 Thus, consid-
ering a probable increase in the number of shipments, it is reasonable to
assume that transportation risks are significant. International regulations
" Id. at 68.
® ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, § 6 at 3.
101 Doub & Dukert, supra note 37, at 765.
102 DeNike, supra note 72, at 5.
'0 ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, § 6 at 7.
IN Id. at 1.
'Os Atchley, Air Transportation of Radioactive Materials and Passenger Protection Under
International Law, 5 CALIF. W. INT'L L. J. 425, 426 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Atchley].
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established by the IAEA require that radioactive materials be delivered to
the shipper in containers specially designed to prevent leakage and ap-
proved by IAEA. °0 Radioactive emissions have also been placed under
limitations considered to be safe for passenger exposure during aircraft
flights.' 7 Such international regulations lack strict enforcement since
IAEA requires domestic regulations to conform to the agency's recom-
mended standards "to the greatest extent possible."'0 8 Conceivably a na-
tion could choose not to follow these regulations on the basis that it is not
feasible to do so.
Since regulations on the transport of radioactive materials are ulti-
mately the responsibility of each nation, it is necessary to examine present
regulations in the United States. Responsibility for such control is divided
between the Department of Transportation and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. Although there has been an increasing number of reported
accidents in recent years, this increase in accidents has gone unchecked
due to the lack of proper investigation and enforcement by both of these
agencies.'0 In fact, the Senate Commerce Committee has concluded that
''noncompliance is the rule rather than the exception in this dangerous
business."" 0 It therefore seems imperative that domestic and international
standards be strengthened in order to avoid injurious consequences result-
ing from transportation of radioactive material.
B. Proliferation Dangers and Domestic Safeguards
Probably the most serious risk attendant to nuclear power exports is the
danger of diversion of nuclear material by foreign governments for the
development of nuclear weapons or explosives."' As of April 1976, 25
Agreements for Cooperation between the United States and 21 individual
nations and two international organizations were in force. Included in
these agreements are 13 NPT parties,"2 two signatories that have not rati-
fied the NPT,"3 six nonparties to the NPT,"' and the two international
organizations. ',I
'" INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, REGULATIONS FOR SAFE TRANSPORT OF RADIOAC-
TivE MATERIALS 196 (rev. ed. 1973).
,*1 Atchley, supra note 105, at 428.
,0 Id. at 429.
'" Id. at 431.
21 S. REP. No. 93-1192, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974).
ERDA No. 1542, supra note 7, § 6 at 1.
112 Australia, Austria, Canada, Republic of China, Finland, Italy, Korea, Norway, Philip-
pines, Sweden, Thailand, United Kingdom and Venezuela. See, e.g., Agreement for Coopera-
tion Between the United States and the Republic of Austria concerning Civil Uses of Atomic
Energy, 21 U.S.T. 10, T.I.A.S. No. 6815 (effective for United States Jan. 24, 1970).
113 Japan and Switzerland.
" Argentina, Brazil, India, Portugal, South Africa and Spain.
. European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA).
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Each Agreement for Cooperation must include, among other things, a
guarantee that the cooperating party will not use any transferred material
for atomic weapons or for any other military purpose."' However, there is
no prohibition on the use of nuclear energy for peaceful nuclear explosions.
Additionally, a recipient country could decide to divert nuclear material
into weapons regardless of the existence of its agreement with the United
States.
The technology for diversion of nuclear material is readily available to
most countries. The most critical stage of the nuclear process is the repro-
cessing stage. Since spent fuel contains uranium-235 and plutonium, both
of which are potential bomb materials, it is possible to produce nuclear
weapons from such fuel."7 It has been estimated that by 1980, recycling of
plutonium can reduce the world's needs for fuel enrichment capacity by
10-25 percent. This would also reduce uranium mining requirements by 20-
25 percent and simplify disposal of highly radioactive wastes." s Enrich-
ment facilities themselves could be a major point of diversion, although the
enrichment process is expensive and power consuming."' Consequently,
the potential for nuclear weapons manufacture will probably increase.
Another source of domestic safeguards is the amended Atomic Energy
Act of 1954.120 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which is given
the responsibility of issuing licenses for nuclear reactors, must first find
that the proposed activity will not be "inimical to the common defense and
security" and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and
safety of the public. 2' It is this language which prompted the first recorded
dissent of a commissioner to the NRC's approval of the export of a nuclear
reactor to Spain, a nation which has refused to ratify the NPT.'2
In his introduction of the NRC decision into the Congressional Record,
Senator Ribicoff stated that this first dissent, voiced by Commissioner
Victor Gilinsky, had made history.' He further explained that the key
issue raised by Gilinsky was the adequacy of IAEA safeguards in detecting
surreptitious removal of plutonium, after it is separated from the spent fuel
of a nuclear power reactor. Ultimately, Ribicoff predicted, the American
people "will have to decide whether the safeguards system of the IAEA-or
any safeguards system-can adequately protect against the potential for
"I Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2153(a)(3) (1970) [hereinafter cited as Atomic
Energy Act].
II? Doub & Dukert, supra note 37, at 761.
t" Id. at 762.
I' d. at 760.
2 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1970).
1' Id. § 2133.
"2 Note 93 supra.
21 95 CONG. REC. S10042 (daily ed. June 21, 1976) (remarks of Senator Ribicoff)
[hereinafter cited as Ribicoff].
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atomic bomb production that exists within the core of every nuclear power-
plant.""'
In approving the export to Spain, the Commission considered four fac-
tors, as set forth in the Atomic Energy Act. The first of these was a deter-
mination of whether an agreement for cooperation would apply to the
proposed export.'25 Answering this in the affirmative, the Commission
found that the proposed export would occur under the terms and condi-
tions of the Agreement for Cooperation between Spain and the United
States. Entered into on June 28, 1974, this agreement provides for coopera-
tion in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for a period of 40 years.2 '
The second factor was whether the applicant was a foreign or alien
corporation. 7 Since the licensee for the export of the nuclear reactor to
Spain is the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, the Commission stated
that Westinghouse is a domestic corporation neither controlled nor owned
by a foreign corporation or government. 28
Whether the proposed export would be inimical to the common defense
and security of the United States was the third factor involved in the NRC
decision. 29 Although the Commission majority believed that the export to
Spain would not cause any danger to United States defense and security,
it is precisely on this point that dissenter Gilinsky disagreed.'3
In considering the fourth factor, the Commission ruled that the Spanish
export would not affect the health and safety of the population of the
United States. Furthermore, the NRC reiterated its view that to assess the
health and safety impacts on foreign countries would be beyond the Com-
mission's jurisdiction. 3'
While he did not oppose the export of the reactor to Spain, Gilinksy did
oppose the export under the conditions and terms of the license. 32 Since
Spain did not agree to use only United States supplied fuel in its reactor,
Gilinsky believed that there would be a potential for the use of fuel not
supplied by the United States and thus without corresponding safeguards.
The IAEA safeguards would apply to the use of fuel not supplied by the
United States with the result that the United States would have no control
over whether and in what circumstances plutonium would be separated
from the Spanish reactor's spent fuel.'33
12 Id. at 10043.
"2 Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1970).
12, Ribicoff, supra note 123, at 10044.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1970).
" Ribicoff, supra note 123, at 10044.
"' Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2133 (1970).
'10 Ribicoff, supra note 123, at 10047.
131 Id.
132 Id.
'1 Id. at 10048.
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Any fuel supplied by the United States which may be processed in the
Spanish reactor would be subject to anti-proliferation measures imposed
by the United States. However, these measures would not apply to any
plutonium produced in the reactor from fuel otherwise obtained. Thus,
"Spain will have the option to use non-U.S.-supplied fuel in Asco II and
consequently to produce plutonium not subject to reprocessing controls." 13 '
Furthermore, the failure of Spain to join the NPT assumes additional
significance.
Gilinsky's suggestion would be to place a condition in the license re-
quiring Spain to exclusively use fuel supplied by the United States in the
reactor. 35 However, the majority refused since it felt that IAEA safeguards,
which would apply to any non-United States-supplied fuel, would be suffi-
ciently effective to prevent diversion into nuclear weapons. Although the
majority speculated that IAEA safeguards would be adequate, Gilinsky
believed that speculation was not sufficient to warrant relinquishing
control over reprocessing to the IAEA. Rather, Gilinsky stated that "we
must be confident that the Agency. . .will in fact bar reprocessing unless
or until further measures can be implemented."'3 6
Although Gilinsky voiced grave concern as to the adequacy of applica-
tion of IAEA safeguards to fuel not supplied by the United States, the
majority believed that his projected inadequacy of IAEA safeguards was
premature. By a vote of three to one the Commission approved the license
of Westinghouse to export a nuclear reactor to Spain.' 37 Nevertheless, there
is now an articulated doubt as to the adequacy of international safeguards.
Other evidence of the concern about the possible diversion dangers of
reprocessed fuel is found in the recently enacted foreign aid bill.'38 Under
its provisions any country that sells or purchases uranium reprocessing
facilities without international safeguards will lose all United States eco-
nomic and military aid.'39 Yet, even in this legislation, one could find
significant apprehension in relying on currently inadequate international
safeguards. Perhaps the most effective solution of the safeguards problem
would be to strengthen international safeguards.
IV. CONCLUSION
One proposed solution to the problem of providing safe and peaceful
production of nuclear power is to establish Regional Nuclear Centers
I Id. at 10049.
135 Id.
136 Id.
'7 Id. at 10047.
13 International Security & Arms Export Control Act of 1976, 22 U.S.C. § 2429 (amending
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961).
"I Environmentalists Attack NRC's Nuclear Fuel Export Licensing, 6 ENVT'L L. REP.
10192-93 (1976).
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throughout the world."10 Financed by different nations, such centers could
remove the temptation to expand national enterprises. If regional centers
were established, then each individual nation would not be forced to ex-
pand its own nuclear facilities. Instead of racing to compete with each
other, each nation could contribute to these centers and cooperate with
each other for the common purpose of producing nuclear power. In addi-
tion, if participants in the facilities of the centers were limited to NPT
parties and if the facilities were placed under IAEA safeguards, the perils
of diversion would be curbed. An added benefit might be enhanced public
support for the peaceful use of the atom.
At the present, reprocessing facilities are located in nuclear weapons
nations. Consequently, nations which do not have nuclear weapons capa-
bilities will feel the urge to develop them, perhaps because of a feeling of
discrimination by and dependence on nations possessing nuclear weapons.
However, if each nation proceeds to construct its own reprocessing and
enrichment facilities, adequate inspection and regulation becomes much
more difficult.'
Regardless of whether the United States continues exporting nuclear
power or completely terminates its exports, it seems imperative that more
research be undertaken in this potentially dangerous area. A slow phase-
out of nuclear energy in favor of alternative sources of energy, i.e., solar
and geothermal energy, could be a welcome development. If this is not
deemed appropriate at present due to the pressures of economics, foreign
policy and technology, a continued program of nuclear energy needs to be
more stringently controlled. The use of nuclear energy and its export to
foreign countries should and must be subservient to the health, safety and
welfare of the worldwide human environment. Only then can the world be
assured that its energy needs will be satisfied today, without injuring or
destroying the natural and human resources of tomorrow.
Gwyn P. Newsom
"' Doub & Dukert, supra note 37, at 769.
141 Id.
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